"A person may cause evil to others not only by his actions by by his inactions, and in either case he is justly accountable to them for his injury" (Mill 13).
This is a profound conjecture, and with respect to Mill I have always found it to be thus. It seems very simple to say that "a person may cause evil to others...by his actions" but it requires a great deal more effort to think about inactions as injurious as well. For instance, refusing to help a person getting beat up because you are afraid you will get hurt, although there are many alternatives than getting physically involved yourself, where you may call the police or get help from another passerby.
The aforementioned situation seems black and white, but what about cases where action causes the death of a human being in order to save another who might have died otherwise? Where is the utility in tradeoff? I am not certain if this applies to Mill's definition of liberty, but every person has a right in every faculty to have a say in the preservation and the worth of their life. But this seems to not be so when it comes to utility, which may make sacrifices (which requires a judgement) in order to do the greatest good for the greatest number of people.
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